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The Case for Special Juries in
Complex Civil Litigation
It is difficult to imagine a less appropriate mechanism for the
determination of facts in a protracted and complicated suit than
the civil jury.1
The common sense of the common man . . . cannot be brought
to bear unless there is comprehension of the facts and the law.
2
With these words an experienced practitioner and the Chief Justice
of the United States expressed their concern over one of the major
issues of modern judicial administration: can juries render satisfactory
verdicts in lengthy, complicated cases? Questions about the abilities of
civil juries have been raised by courts,3 scholars,4 practicing attorneys,5
and the press. 6 Many believe that juries are ill-equipped to understand
the factual and legal issues involved in complex business litigation.
Defenders of the jury, however, contend not only that jury trials are
preferable to bench trials, 7 but also that denying the right to a jury
trial is, in many cases, unconstitutional."
This debate has focused on the choice between trial by a traditional
jury and trial by a judge alone. A third alternative has not received the
attention it deserves: a trial could be conducted before a special jury
of persons chosen especially for their ability to understand a protracted
1. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry? 70 F.R.D.
199, 208 (1976).
2. Natl L.J., Aug. 13, 1979, at 21, col. I (reporting and quoting in part address by
Chief Justice Warren Burger to the Conference of State Chief Justices (Aug. 7, 1979)).
3. E.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 423, 444, 447 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99,
104 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
4. E.g., Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality
of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. Rv. 486, 505 (1975); Comment, The Right to
an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10
CONN. L. REv. 775, 783-86 (1978).
5. E.g., Campbell, A Historical Basis for Banning Juries, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 11, 1980, at
17, col. 1; Kirkham, supra note 1, at 207-09.
6. E.g., Work, Are Jurors Smart Enough? Nat'l L.J., Dec. 31, 1979, at I, col. 1; Shaffer,
Those Complex Antitrust Cases, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1978, at 16, col. 4.
7. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 934-35
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation
of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. Rav. 47, 53 (1977).
8. E.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S. April 28, 1980) (No. 79-1383); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
1155
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 1155, 1980
and complex case. Although the special jury has been suggested as a
possible solution to some of the problems of trying a complicated case,
it has not been adequately discussed.9 In particular, no commentator
has demonstrated that special juries can meet the constitutional require-
ments of the Seventh Amendment or of the due process clause. This
Note provides that analysis and proposes that Congress amend the
federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 196810 to allow the use of
special juries in certain complex cases.
The Note outlines the difficulties of trying complex cases and dis-
cusses ways in which special juries are superior to judges or traditional
juries for the resolution of such matters. Examining the constitutional
dimensions of trial by a special jury, the Note demonstrates that, for
the trial of complex cases, the special jury more nearly approaches the
9. Several recent discussions of the use of juries in complex civil litigation mention the
special jury as an alternative to a traditional jury trial or a bench trial. The constitu-
tional and practical problems presented by the special jury, however, have not been in-
vestigated, nor have any specific proposals been developed. See, e.g., Harris & Liberman,
Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust Case? 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 611, 634-36
(1979) (discussing special juries as alternative to wholesale elimination of juries in com-
plex cases, but with only passing mention of historical background, constitutional ques-
tions, or practical difficulties); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litiga-
tion, 92 HARv. L. REV. 898, 915-17 (1979) (same); Note, The Right to Trial by Jury in
Complex Litigation, 20 Wm. & MARY L. Rv. 829, 352 (1978) (suggesting amendment of
Jury Selection and Service Act to allow use of special juries in order to increase jury
competence in complex cases, but no discussion of constitutional concerns).
Proposals for special juries previously appeared in the 1940s, but they failed to
attract significant support. In 1941, a discussion draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act
proposed "merchant jury" trials to determine special issues of "mercantile fact" in dis-
putes governed by the Act. The merchant jury was not to resolve issues of liability, but
merely render "special verdicts" to be received in evidence at the "general trial." See
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REPORT ON A REVISED
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 51-C & Comments on § 51-C (1941). Following the conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in September of that year, the advisory char-
acter of the proposed "merchant jury" was made clear in the NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMsuISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS, REvISED UNIFORM SALES ACT, SECOND DArF
§ 59-D (1941). The "merchant jury" became "merchant experts," and the jury was
specifically authorized to disregard the "special findings"e-f necessary. The differences
between the language of the discussion draft and that of the published version may be
attributable to the drafters' recognition of constitutional objections to their proposal. Id.
at Comment on § 59-D.
Other commentators also have suggested the use of special juries. See, e.g., Baker, In
Defense of the "Blue Ribbon" Jury, 85 IOWA L. Rev. 409 (1950); Thatcher, Why Not
Use the Special Jury? 31 MINN. L. REV. 232 (1947). Although the historical background in
these articles generally is good, their consideration of Seventh Amendment and due
process issues is limited. This Note will address both the historical and constitutional
dimensions of the case for using special juries.
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875 (1976). The Jury Selection and Service Act sets out specific
means for selecting and summoning juries. In its current form, the Act would not allow
the measures necessary to choose special jurors. Possibilities for amending the Act to
permit the selection of special jurors are outlined in Part III of this Note. See pp. 1174-
76 infra.
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constitutional ideals of fairness, competence, and impartiality than does
the traditional jury. The Note concludes by setting forth constitution-
ally acceptable procedures for selecting and administering special juries
and suggests ways in which the special jury can be a partial solution to
'the problems posed by complex civil litigation."
I. The Problems of Juries in Complex Civil Litigation
The burdens that complex, protracted litigation places on the federal
courts1 2 have brought the institution of the civil jury under attack.
Juries have been criticized for being incapable of returning fair and
rational decisions in complicated business cases. 13 First, it is argued that
the technical, legal, and economic concepts that arise in much business
litigation are beyond the experience or understanding of the average
juror.' 4 Moreover, it has been observed that jurors who may be better
prepared by education or experience to understand such issues are more
likely to be challenged for cause and excused at the voir dire stage of the
proceedings.'
Second, it is contended that the very size of the trials in complex
11. This Note proposes only that special juries be employed in complex civil litiga-
tion in the federal courts. The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases has
not been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, see Melancon v. McKeithen, 345
F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), afj'd sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973), and
Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), and thus the states may modify the civil jury so
long as the requirements of due process are observed, id.; see pp. 1166-72 infra.
12. Between 1962 and 1978 the total number of trials completed per year in the federal
district courts increased from 10,048 to 18,851. [197 8] DiRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIv E
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. Table 60, at 262. The number of jury
trials per year lasting 20 days or more doubled from 40 in 1972 to 80 in 1978. Id. Table
61, at 263. In 1978, 34% of the trials lasting four days or more were antitrust matters. Id.
at 264.
13. See p. 1155 sup ra.
14. At the completion of one protracted civil trial, the federal district judge stated:
Throughout the trial, the court felt that the jury was having trouble grasping the
concepts that were being discussed by the expert witnesses, most of whom had
doctorate degrees in their specialties. This perception was confirmed when the court
questioned the jurors during the course of their deliberations and after they were
discharged. When asked by the court whether a case of this type should be tried to
a jury, the foreman of the jury said, "If you can find a jury that's both a computer
technician, a lawyer, an economist, knows all about that stuff, yes, I think you could
have a qualified jury, but we don't know anything about that."
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423,
447 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (quoting transcript at 19,548).
15. In one major antitrust case, SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn.
1978), 84 potential jurors appeared for jury selection. Twenty-two of those had occupa-
tional backgrounds identifiable as relevant to the case, such as managers, supervisors,
scientists, or engineers. All 22 were excused for cause. Comment, supra note 4, at 778-80;
cf. Work, supra note 6, at 11, col. 4 (statements by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge
Julius Title that jurors with special expertise are weeded out in voir dire).
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litigation renders jury determination inappropriate. Untutored jurors
may have great difficulty in digesting the massive amounts of evidence
presented in complicated cases' and in resolving the conflicting claims
and counterclaims of a large number of parties. 17 In addition, the
length of many complex trials reduces the effectiveness of the jury by
making jury service an excessive burden.'8
The alternative to trying complex cases before a traditional jury
ordinarily is assumed to be trial by a judge alone.' 9 Recently, however,
some judges themselves have expressed doubt that a judge can perform
better than a jury in deciding complicated questions of fact.20 The
collective wisdom and experience of a jury is said to be equal if not
superior to that of a single judge.2 The presence of a jury forces at-
torneys to refine their arguments, marshal the facts, and make effective
presentations, 22 an incentive that often is lost in the less structured
16. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978). In this case, 87 witnesses testified and more than 2,300
exhibits were admitted in a trial consuming 96 trial days. The transcript for the trial
filled more than 19,000 pages. After 19 days of deliberation the jury was hopelessly dead-
locked and the court declared a mistrial. Id. at 444. The court directed a verdict for the
defendant but struck a demand for a jury trial in the event the decision was remanded
for retrial. Id. at 448.
17. See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 705-06, 715 (S.D. Cal.
1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S. April 28,
1980) (No. 79-1383) (striking demand for jury trial because of complexity of case; 18
cases were consolidated for trial, five classes were certified, 20 individual defendants and
80 corporate or partnership defendants were involved, and many of the defendants filed
cross-claims).
18. E.g., In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976)
(concern expressed that only persons with no exposure to business world would be decid-
ing lengthy commercial cases).
Chief Justice Burger has recognized this problem:
It borders on cruelty to draft people to sit for long periods trying to cope with
issues largely beyond their grasp . . . . Even Jefferson would be appalled at the
prospect of a dozen of his yeomen and artisans trying to cope with some of today's
complex litigation in a trial lasting many weeks or months.
Nat'1 L.J., supra note 2, at 21, col. 1-2 (quoting address by Chief Justice Warren Burger
to the Conference of State Chief Justices (Aug. 7, 1979)).
19. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 934
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (jury critics overlook fact that alternative to lay jury is lay judge); Note,
The Securities Exchange Act and the Rule of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 89 YALE L.J.
95, 104 n.39 (1979) (assuming choice is between jury trial and bench trial in complicated
securities cases).
20. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 934-35
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 53.
21. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 935
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
22. See Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 54 (process of distilling complex material into
comprehensible form operates less effectively in bench trials than in jury trials because
rules of evidence only loosely followed in bench trials).
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atmosphere of a bench trial.23 Furthermore, juries have been praised
for bringing elements to their decisions that judges alone cannot pro-
vide. A judge can write reasoned opinions on the basis of knowledge
and experience, but only a jury can make so-called "black-box deci-
sions"; 24 when the equities of the case do not lend themselves to
reasoned articulation, a jury can render judgment without explanation,
avoiding the need for a formal judicial opinion that might seem un-
convincing or arbitrary. Moreover, only a jury can "insure that the
decisions will reflect contemporary community values in courts other-
wise dominated by judges with life tenure." 25 Finally, the Seventh
Amendment may limit the ability to do away with the jury in many
complicated suits.
Trial of complex cases by a special jury is a desirable alternative to
trial by a judge alone or to trial by an ordinary jury. A jury composed
of particularly qualified individuals could understand sophisticated
concepts that might be beyond the abilities of either a judge or a
traditional jury. Jury confusion would be less of a problem than it is
with jurors who are unfamiliar with the technical, financial, and legal
issues involved in much of today's complicated litigation. 26 There also
would be less likelihood of an irrational verdict because the special
jurors would be able to make a reasoned decision based on their under-
standing of the facts and the law.
The presence of a special jury would preserve the advantages of a
traditional jury trial over trial by a judge alone. The "fierce discipline"
of a jury trial 27 still would force attorneys to streamline their cases and
to present them convincingly. In addition, the jury would be present to
provide the "commonsense judgment of the community" and to protect
the parties from "the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased
response of a judge."28 The original role of the jury "as a protective
23. Id. (in bench trials, counsel drop "evidentiary antennae," lose sensitivity to ques-
tions of relevance, and fail to marshal proof; jury trial imposes "a fierce discipline on the
advocates').
24. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 941
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (quoting Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REv.
443, 457 (1899)).
25. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 941 (E.D. Pa.
1979); see Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 58.
26. See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 712-13 (S.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S. April 28, 1980)
(No. 79-1383) (before striking jury demand because case was too complex, court enumerated
issues with which trier of fact would have to be familiar in order to render verdict).
27. Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 53-54.
28. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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shield between the litigants and the danger of an arbitrary decision by
the sovereign" 29 would thus remain intact.
II. Special Juries and the Constitution
Although the special jury may be a desirable alternative to either a
bench trial or a traditional jury trial, it cannot be employed unless it
satisfies the Constitution's requirements for trial by jury. The Seventh
Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment estab-
lish the constitutional standards for civil jury trials. The special jury
must be shown to meet these standards while providing a practical
solution to the problems of complex civil litigation.
A. The Seventh Amendment and the Historical Test
The Seventh Amendment "preserved" the right of trial by jury in
suits at common law when the amount in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars.30 The absence from the body of the Constitution of any provi-
sion for jury trials in civil cases was a primary source of controversy
during the ratification debates of 1787-1788,31 yet there remains almost
no direct evidence of the intent of the framers of the Amendment it-
self.3 2 Lacking any documentary assistance in construing the Seventh
Amendment, courts generally have decided whether a party has a right
to a jury trial in a given case by reference to English practice in 1791,
the date of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.33 On the basis of his-
29. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
30. The Seventh Amendment states: "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
31. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L.
Rv. 639, 668-69 (1973). The delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 discussed a
jury trial guarantee for civil cases only briefly and only during the last days of the
convention. In the end, they chose not to include in the Constitution any provision for the
right to a jury trial in civil cases. Id. at 656-66. That omission-indeed the absence of any
bill of rights-became one of the major weapons in the antifederalist arsenal during the
ratification debates of 1787-1788. Id. at 667-725 (state-by-state account of ratification de-
bates concerning omission of jury trial guarantee from Constitution). The issue did not
prove sufficient to block ratification, but a guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases was
included in the Bill of Rights with little recorded discussion. Id. at 725-30. See generally
R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791 (1955).
32. See Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv.
289, 291 (1966).
33. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). The historical test for applying
the Seventh Amendment was first enunciated in 1812 by Justice Story in United States v.
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (No. 16,750) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812):
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to [in the Seventh Amendment]
is not the common law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all), but it
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torical investigation, the courts determine whether the case would
have gone to a jury in eighteenth-century England. If so, the Amend-
ment is held to grant a right to a jury trial. Should the suit be of a type
unknown in the eighteenth century-for example, an antitrust mat-
ter-reference is made to the closest common law analogue as the basis
for the decision. 34
Once it has been determined that a right to a jury trial exists in a
given case, there is a certain amount of freedom in giving procedural
form to the constitutional right.35 Courts frequently have held that the
aim of the Seventh Amendment was to preserve the substance of the
jury trial right rather than the exact incidents and details of eighteenth-
century procedure. 36 As Justice Brandeis stated, "New devices may be
used to adapt the ancient institution to present needs and to make of it
an efficient instrument in the administration of justice. Indeed, such
changes are essential to the preservation of the right." 37 Reasonable
modifications of the jury trial right have been allowed so long as they
do not conflict with the fundamental meaning of the Amendment. 38
In recent years, historical interpretation of the right to a civil jury
under the Seventh Amendment has been attacked on a number of
fronts,39 and the Supreme Court has provided hints that its loyalty to
is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot
be necessary for me to expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must be
obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the law.
Id. at 750. No further authority was given for this reference to English practice; the test
as stated in Wonson remains virtually unchallenged. As one commentator observed, "per-
haps later judges have hesitated to appear to be the kind of intractable person that would
require Mr. Justice Story to elaborate on the obvious." Wolfram, supra note 31, at 641.
Although courts did not begin using the English practice of 1791 as the standard until
after lfonson, that facet of the historical test is now well-entrenched. See Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935). The explanation for not having focused earlier on the
practice of 1791 may simply be the requirements of an evolving common law. The time
frame may have been irrelevant in earlier cases because the practices in dispute were
substantially the same as they had been in the eighteenth century. Only when new pro-
cedures had emerged and old ones had undergone major changes was reference to the
practice of a particular date necessary. Wolfram, supra note 31, at 642.
34. See, e.g., Harris & Liberman, supra note 9, at 611-12 & n.5 (discussing common law
analogues to present antitrust laws).
35. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-60 (1973) (intention of framers was
to preserve right to jury trial rather than mere formal incidents of trial by jury).
36. E.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390, 392 (1943); Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 US. 654, 657 (1935).
37. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920) (footnote omitted).
38. See Henderson, supra note 32, at 336-37; Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the
Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 1002, 1022 (1979).
39. Criticism of the historical test has taken many forms. Some critics have argued
that adherence to the test binds courts to antiquated eighteenth-century procedures, e.g.,
Comment, supra note 4, at 787, that do not always yield quick or correct results, e.g.,
Note, supra note 38, at 1023. Other observers have attacked the use of a historical test not
because of any inherent defects, but because of mistakes in its application. They point
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the historical test is giving way.40 Nonetheless, historical analysis re-
mains the norm for examining jury trial questions.4' Any proposed
change in the use of civil juries thus must be shown to comport with
the practice of English courts in 1791.
out that assumptions about eighteenth-century English practices are often questionable,
see, e.g., Chesnin & Hazard, Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: Jury Trial
of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 YALE L.J. 999, 1018, 1020 (1974) (contrary to usual
assumption, evidence indicates use of jury trial to decide issues of fact in English Court
of Chancery in eighteenth century), while the historical inquiry that occurs frequently
leads to erroneous or inconclusive results, see, e.g., Note, supra note 38, at 1023.
In place of a strict historical test, various of these critics have suggested that the
Seventh Amendment be interpreted flexibly, Henderson, supra note 32, at 336-37, or
with a "'dynamic' reading," Wolfram, sufpra note 31, at 745. A more cynical opponent of
the civil jury has recommended that the historical test be applied rigorously in order to
restrict the use of a jury to precisely those actions in which such a right existed in
eighteenth-century England. Redish, supra note 4, at 514-17. The only proposal to have
received a measure of judicial approval would read the Fifth Amendment right to due
process of law as limiting the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Comment, supra
note 4, at 798-99; see In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D.
Wash. 1976) (if jury not impartial and capable finder of fact, fairness guaranteed to
litigants by Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may be denied).
40. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (despite historical tradition to con-
trary, Seventh Amendment right to jury trial extends to stockholder's derivative suit with
respect to issues upon which corporation suing in its own right would have been entitled
to jury trial). The Ross Court stated that among the factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether there is a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment are "the prac-
tical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. at 538 n.10. This unsupported footnote is at
the center of the debate over the existence of a right to a jury trial in a complex civil
case.
Those who oppose the use of juries in complex cases argue that the Ross footnote is of
constitutional dimension, creating a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial. See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 710-11
S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S.
April 28, 1980) (No. 79-1383); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 105
(W.D. Wash. 1976). Proponents of the jury point to the long tradition of the historical
test and contend that the Supreme Court would not break with such a tradition in a
footnote as cursory as that in Ross. They refuse to regard the Ross footnote as anything
but the most general guide for applying the Seventh Amendment and certainly not a
constitutional ruling. See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 425 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S. April 28, 1980) (No. 79-1383); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 926-27 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
The Supreme Court has made no effort to expand upon its elusive statement in Ross.
In the absence of further judicial explanation, even critics of the historical interpretation
have been forced to admit to its continued vitality. See, e.g., Shapiro & Coquillette, The
Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases, 85 HARV. L. REv. 442, 449 (1971). This Note bypasses
the Ross controversy over the right to a jury trial in a complex case by arguing that,
regardless of the outcome of the current debate, the special jury preserves the best features
of both traditional jury trial and bench trial and is, therefore,, a constitutional and
desirable solution to the problems presented by the complex case.
41. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (historical inquiry made before
reaching decision that six-person jury satisfies Seventh Amendment right to jury in civil
cases); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S. April 28, 1980) (No. 79-1383) (reaffirming validity of historical test
and denying complexity exception to Seventh Amendment); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (denying motion to strike
jury demand in complex case after extensive historical discussion).
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Special juries are in fact part of a long historical tradition in England.
Juries of particularly qualified persons have been in use since the
middle ages to decide cases that might be outside the experience of
ordinary jurors.42 In fourteenth-century London, juries of fishmongers
and cooks sat in judgment on persons accused of selling bad food.43
Although these special or merchant juries continued to be employed
in commercial settings throughout the next several centuries, 44 their
use was irregular and unsystematic until the eighteenth century.43
In 1724, however, a case arose addressing the right to a special jury
in a trial at nisi prius.46 Whether prompted by that case or for other
reasons, Parliament in 1730 passed An Act for the Better Regulation
of Juries.47 The Act granted either party a right to a special jury in
trials at bar or at the assizes4s and also detailed the procedures to be
42. See Thayer, The Jury and Its Development (pt. 2), 5 HARV. L. REv. 295, 300 (1892).
The special jury as used in England was of two basic types. The first type was composed
of persons possessing expertise in some nonlegal field to act as informed judges of the
facts in matters requiring their special knowledge. See W. CORNISH, THE JURY 31-32 (1968).
It is this first type of special or merchant jury that is of interest for the purposes of this
Note. The second type of special jury simply employed persons of higher social or
economic status; no special knowledge or background was required. Id. This latter form
of the special jury was used in criminal prosecutions as well as in civil cases, a practice
that was denounced during the seditious libel trials of the late eighteenth century. Id.
at 32. But see THE LETT-RS oF JUNIUS 19 (J. Cannon ed. 1978) (special jury proposed as
alternative fact-finder if ordinary jury thought incapable of recognizing seditious libel).
It seems to have been the second type of special jury that provoked Jeremy Bentham's
vitriolic attack on the use of special juries. J. BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF
PACKING As APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES (London 1821).
43. See Thayer, supra note 42, at 300.
44. See, e.g., 2 J. LILLY, THE PRACTICAL REGISTER 122 (London 1719), 154 (2d ed.
London 1745). Lilly's Practical Register was a brief compendium of the case law similar
to present-day digests. That the merchant jury was mentioned in both the 1719 and the
1745 editions indicates that special or merchant juries had been a feature of the English
legal landscape since at least the beginning of the eighteenth century. Cf. Pickering v.
Barkley, Styles 132, 82 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B. 1649) (merchant jury called in "to satisfie the
Court" regarding matter of mercantile usage, but unclear whether merchant jury actually
rendered verdict).
45. See C. Firoor, LORD MANSFIELD 104 (1936).
46. Rex v. Burridge, 8 Mod. 245, 88 Eng. Rep. 175 (K.B. 1724). The question in
Burridge was whether a special jury could be ordered without the consent of both parties
in a trial at nisi prius, that is, a trial held before justices riding circuit. The master
searched for precedents and found several such cases, though all were more than 30
years old. Since that time, motions for a special jury at nisi prius had all been denied.
The justices decided that a special jury might be granted to try causes at bar without the
consent of the parties, but not in trials at nisi prius unless some good cause could be
shown. Id. at 248, 88 Eng. Rep. at 177.
47. 3 Geo. 2, c. 25 (1730).
48. Id. § 15; see 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358 (interpreting the statute to
that effect). Trial at bar refers to trial before the full court sitting at Westminster Hall.
See T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 165-67 (5th ed. 1956). This
is to be distinguished from trial at nisi prius or the assizes, both of which usually were
held before justices riding circuit. Although commissions of assize and those of nisi prius
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used in selecting and compensating such juries.49 The statute was made
perpetual in 173350 and was further amended in 1751.51 After 1730, the
use of the special jury gradually became more frequent.52
Under Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1756
to 1788, 53 special juries were "converted [from] an occasional into
a regular institution."54 Prior to Lord Mansfield's tenure, the common
law was without a set of well-defined principles by which to resolve
commercial disputes. 55 Mansfield began filling this void by allowing
special juries of London merchants to decide commercial cases accord-
ing to the common practice and experience of their profession.50 The
Chief Justice would then use the jury's findings to state broad legal
principles.5" Mansfield and his fellow justices employed special juries
had different origins and were for different purposes, they had been combined in the
middle ages into a system known by the eighteenth century as the assizes. See J. BAKER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 19-20 (2d ed. 1979).
49. An Act for the Better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, c. 25, §§ 16-18 (1730).
50. 6 Geo. 2, c. 37, § 1 (1733). In the eighteenth century, Parliament regularly passed
laws that were to expire after three years. At the end of that time the statute could be
allowed to expire automatically, it could be renewed for another limited period of time,
or it could be made perpetual. To make an act perpetual meant only that it would be in
effect until repealed by a subsequent act of Parliament. See, e.g., E. THOMPSON, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS 206 (1975).
51. An Act for the Better Regulation of Trials by Jury, 24 Geo. 2, c. 18, §§ 1-2 (1751).
52. See, e.g., Richardson v. Bradshaw, I Atk. 128, 26 Eng. Rep. 84 (K.B. 1752) (on
direction from Chancery, two issues regarding mercantile usage under bankruptcy statutes
tried by special jury); Wilks v. Eames, Andrews 51, 95 Eng. Rep. 293 (K.B. 1737) (suit on
insurance policy tried by special jury at nisi prius in London).
53. William Murray, Lord Mansfield, dominated the Court of King's Bench during his
term as Chief Justice and generally is credited with having transformed mercantile law
from a chaotic conglomeration of customs into a systematic body of doctrine. See C.
FIFooT, supra note 45 (legal biography); Rigg, William Murray, first Earl of Mansfield,
39 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 409-15 (1894) (general biographical information).
54. C. FnFoor, supra note 45, at 105.
55. See W. CoRNISH, sutra note 42, at 31-32.
56. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rucker, 2 Burr. 1167, 97 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1761) (measure of
damages under policy insuring ship's cargo decided by jury of merchants). In the course
of his opinion in Lewis, Lord Mansfield stated the case for the use of special merchant
juries:
The special Jury, (amongst whom there were many knowing and considerable
Merchants,) found the Defendant's Rule of Estimation to be right, and gave their
Verdict for him. They understood the Question very well, and knew more of the
Subject of it than any Body else present; and formed their Judgment from their own
Notions and Experience, without much Assistance from any thing that passed.
rd. at 1168, 97 Eng. Rep. at 770.
It appears that merchant juries sometimes acted as nothing more than advisory juries
or expert witnesses. See, e.g., Hankey v. Jones, 2 Cowper 745, 98 Eng. Rep. 1339 (K.B.
1778). The cases and the statute make it clear, however, that merchant juries also were
employed to make a final determination of the general issue. See, e.g., notes 59-64 infra
(citing cases employing merchant juries); 3 Geo. 2, c. 25 (1730) (regulating use of special
juries).
57. See C. Firoor, supra note 45, at 108-09. By formulating legal principles out of the
special jury's findings, Lord Mansfield was codifying the diverse practices of merchants
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in a wide variety of commercial situations,58 including cases concern-
ing negotiable instruments,"0 marine insurance policies,60 contracts for
the sale of goods,," and the bankruptcy statutes. 62 The special jury was
not, however, permitted to dictate to the court. If the jury's decision
was unreasonable or contrary to previously decided cases, the court
would step in and settle the matter as one of law.0 3
The institution of the merchant jury did not die with Lord Mans-
field. Lord Ellenborough of the King's Bench carried Mansfield's
methods for employing the special jury into the nineteenth century 4
and statutes mentioning the special jury appeared in 182505 and again
into a consistent body of commercial law. Id. Trial judges are no longer expected to fill
such an expansive role as codifiers, nor would it be required of them under this Note's
proposal for the use of special juries. See pp. 1172-76 infra.
58. Although Lord Mansfield took the lead in the use of merchant jurors to decide
cases that were outside the experience of ordinary jurors, he does not seem to have been
alone in his use of the device. See, e.g., Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Campb. 537, 170 Eng. Rep.
1243 (K.B. 1810) (Ellenborough, C.J., presiding at trial); Tindal v. Brown, I T.R. 167, 99
Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1786) (Buller, J., presiding at trial); Richardson v. Bradshaw, 1
Atk. 128, 26 Eng. Rep. 84 (K.B. 1752) (Lee, C.J., presiding at trial). But see Devlin, jury
Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80
COLUmn. L. REV. 43, 83 (1980) (no indication that "'trained corps of jurors'" was ever
employed outside of Lord Mansfield's domain).
59. E.g., Tindal v. Brown, I T.R. 167, 99 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1786); Grant v.
Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516, 97 Eng. Rep. 957 (K.B. 1764).
60. E.g., Camden v. Cowley, I BlackAV. 417, 96 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1763); Lewis v.
Rucker, 2 Burr. 1167, 97 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1761).
61. E.g., Hodgson v. Davies, 2 Campb. 530, 170 Eng. Rep. 1241 (K.B. 1810).
62. E.g., Richardson v. Bradshaw, I Atk. 128, 26 Eng. Rep. 84 (K.B. 1752).
63. See, e.g., Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Campb. 537, 170 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1810). In
Rickford the issue was the time within which a check or bill had to be presented for
payment. A member of the special jury observed that the practice of merchants varied
according to the different commercial customs obtaining east and west of St. Paul's in
London. Lord Ellenborough held that the question was one of the payee's reasonable
diligence; whatever the practices were in various parts of London, the legal rule must be
one of commercial convenience. Id. at 538-40, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1244-45. Justice Buller
stated a similar view in Appleton v. Sweetapple, 3 Doug. 137, 99 Eng. Rep. 579 (K.B. 1782):
In a question of law, however unpleasant it may be to us, we must not yield to the
decision of a jury. I do not doubt that a special jury in London will, if desired, find
a special verdict. The usage is to be considered, but such usage must be reasonable,
and it is for the Court to say whether it is good or bad.
Id. at 140, 99 Eng. Rep. at 580.
It has been recognized that some judicial control of juries was practiced in eighteenth-
century England. See Henderson, supra note 32, at 299-320. Despite these methods of con-
trol, however, special juries retained the power to determine the general issue. See note
56 supra. Similarly, modern mechanisms for jury control-such as judgments n.o.v. and
directed verdicts-could be employed today without sacrificing the benefits of trying
complex cases before special juries.
64. See, e.g., Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Campb. 537, 170 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1810) (special
jury used in case concerning negotiable instruments); Hodgson v. Davies, 2 Campb. 530,
170 Eng. Rep. 1241 (K.B. 1810) (special jury employed in suit on contract for sale of
goods).
65. 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, §§ 30-36 (1825).
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in 1852.66 All of the evidence indicates that, in 1791, the use of special
juries in cases outside the experience of ordinary jurors was an estab-
lished part of English procedure.0 7 Thus the use of special juries in
modern complex litigation would satisfy the historical requirements of
the Seventh Amendment.
B. The Cross Section of the Community
Standard and Due Process of Law
The Constitution requires more of the special jury than that it meet
the historical test of the Seventh Amendment. A litigant is also con-
stitutionally entitled to a jury drawn from a cross section of the com-
66. Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 76, §§ 108-113. The special jury
survived in England in one form or another well into this century. Special juries were
abolished by statute in 1949. Juries Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 18. Although an
exception was made to preserve the special juries from the City of London in commercial
cases in the King's Bench Division, id. § 19, no special jury has been used since 1950.
W. CORNISH, supra note 42, at 33. In 1971 Parliament abolished the special jury altogether.
Courts Act, 1971, c. 23, § 40. It must be borne in mind that the special jury has had
company in its neglect; the civil jury in general has all but disappeared from English
courts. See W. CORNISH, supra note 42, at 33.
67. See 3 M. BACON, A NEw ABRIDGMENT OF THE Law 250 (5th ed. London 1786) (6th
ed. London 1793), 745 (Ist American ed. from 6th London ed. Philadelphia 1813) (men-
tioning use of special juries).
Although colonial American lawyers were aware of the use of special juries in com-
mercial matters, evidence indicates that the practice was never as extensive here as in
England. See M. HoRwrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION or AMERICAN LAw 155-59 (1977). Both
New York and South Carolina had statutes allowing the use of special juries in mercantile
disputes. Id. at 155, 158. The statutes were passed during the colonial period but con-
tinued in force after independence had been won. Id. at 155, 158. Although the statutes
remained on the books, special juries seem to have been used only rarely in either state
after the first decade of the nineteenth century. Id. at 157-59. The reasons for the dis-
appearance are unclear. Morton Horwitz suggests that a general pattern of judicial
hostility to competing sources of law was one factor. Id. at 155. Perhaps another was the
fragmentation of the community of interest among merchants. See id. at 159. Whatever
the reasons, it is certain that the use of particularly qualified special jurors to determine
questions of fact within their area of expertise has not appeared in America since the
early nineteenth century.
Special juries of other types were in occasional use in various parts of the United States
well into the twentieth century. There seems to be no pattern to these manifestations of
the special jury either in selection procedures or in the cases to be tried. See generally
Baker, supra note 9 (explaining and defending New York's well-developed special jury
system); Thatcher, supra note 9, at 241-42 (discussing Minnesota's nineteenth-century
experiment with special juries). New York appears to be the only state to have used
special juries extensively in this century. Such juries were employed in criminal pros-
ecutions for corruption, in large will contests, in suits involving stocks or bonds, and
in other complicated litigation. See Thatcher, suPra note 9, at 252-54. Although the New
York special jury system was held to be constitutional, Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947),
the device seems to have fallen into disuse and was eliminated in 1965, Act of July 15,
1965, ch. 778, § 3, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1853. Because the historical test requires reference to
eighteenth-century English practice, the American experience of special juries is irrelevant
except insofar as it reflects a certain amount of constitutional acceptance. Cf. Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (affirming constitutionality of New York's special jury system).
1166
Juries in Complex Cases
munity s and to one that comports with the twin due process require-
ments of impartiality and rationality.0 Under the mandate of cross-
sectionality, Congress and the courts require that juries fairly represent
the communities from which they are drawn;70 potential jurors must
be selected at random from a cross section of the population 7' in order
not to violate the constitutional standards of due process and equal
protection.72 Trial by other than a group chosen from a cross section
of the community has been said to weaken the institution of the jury
trial, 73 to reduce public participation in the judicial process, 74 and to
endanger a litigant's rights. 75 Furthermore, the values of the com-
munity may not be represented if the jury is drawn from less than a
68. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
69. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.); In re
Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
70. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (prohibiting exclusion from
jury service of all women who had not attended jury preparation classes conducted by
prosecution); 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976) (requiring that grand and petit juries be selected at
random from fair cross section of community).
71. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (male kidnapping defendant
denied right to trial by impartial jury because no women included on jury venire unless
they specifically requested to be subject to jury service); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (constitutionally unjustified to exclude daily wage-earners from jury
service in civil personal injury suit). Thiel is the only case in which the Court has
applied the cross-section requirement to civil juries. The opinion makes clear that the
cross-section standard applies to civil and criminal cases with equal strength. Id. at 220;
ef. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976) (no exception to cross-section requirement stated for civil jury).
There is a possibility of confusion over whether the cross-section requirement applies to
the jury itself or only to the selection of jury venires. The language of some opinions
might create the impression that a cross section of the community must be represented on
each jury. See, e.g., Goins v. Allgood, 391 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 1968) (desire for com-
petent jurors must not lead to selections that do not comport with concept of jury as cross
section of community). This would cause difficult practical problems and would call into
question the constitutionality of the peremptory challenge. See Note, Peremptory Chal-
lenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177 (1980) (opposing
application of Taylor to limit peremptory challenge); cf. Note, Limiting the Peremptory
Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977) (favoring
application of Taylor to limit peremptory challenges that cause "unrepresentative" juries).
The most recent Supreme Court cases interpreting cross-sectionality seem to apply the
standard to jury venires alone. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979); Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). It is clear that a jury need not be a mirror image
of the community. Id.
72. E.g., Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947
(1975); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 11 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967).
73. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
74. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529-30 (1975) (legislative history of
federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 demonstrates congressional recognition that
jury "plays a political function in the administration of the law" and that requirement
of jury chosen from fair cross section of community is "fundamental to the American
system of justice"); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942) (notions of proper
jury role have developed in harmony with "basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government").
75. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.) (white
defendant denied due process because blacks excluded from grand and petit juries).
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fair cross section. 0 Broad community participation in the administra-
tion of justice must be maintained, for it is critical to public confidence
in the judicial system.77
Despite the apparent force of the cross-section requirement, it is not
the potent engine against the use of special juries that might be sup-
posed. Not only are the cases setting forth the cross section of the
community standard distinguishable,78 the standard itself has its limits.
The state has been found to have a legitimate interest in excluding from
jury service persons who are not equal to the tasks that will be required
of them.79 The cross-section requirement thus allows reasonable classi-
fications of persons that are related to the individual's ability to perform
the duties of a juror efficiently and intelligently.80 To this end, the
federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 196881 disqualifies certain
groups from jury service: anyone who is not a United States citizen;
anyone unable to read, write, speak, or understand English; anyone
whose mental or physical infirmities render satisfactory jury service
impossible; and anyone charged with or convicted of a felony.8 2 These
76. Cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 941 (E.D.
Pa. 1979) (only jury can ensure that verdicts will reflect contemporary community values
in courts dominated by tenured judges).
77. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
78. The cases requiring that juries represent a cross section of the community com-
prise a narrow range of situations that are distinguishable from those encountered in
complex civil litigation. All of the cross-sectionality cases addressed efforts to identify
and exclude from the jury members of a particular group for reasons unrelated to their
ability to perform the functions of jurors. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480-
81 (1954) (persons of Mexican ancestry); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 221
(1946) (persons earning a daily wage). The particular circumstances of many of the cases
suggest a concern on the part of the courts that the jury selection process was being used
to persecute minorities and to exclude them from the institutions of government. See, e.g.,
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.); Carter v. Jury
Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). In addition, a majority of the cases were
criminal trials in which those excluded from the jury were likely to have been more
receptive to the defendant's point of view. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954) (persons of Mexican ancestry excluded from Mexican-American defendant's jury);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (blacks excluded from black defendant's jury). But see
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.) (exclusion of
discernible class from jury service injures not only defendants who belong to excluded
class, but other defendants as well). Selecting special juries would not require the iden-
tification or exclusion of any particular group, nor, under the proposal outlined in this
Note, see pp. 1172-76 infra, would the complex cases isolated for trial before a special
jury present opportunities for personal prejudice or individual bias to affect the jury's
deliberations.
79. Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1975).
80. E.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 331-33 (1970) (order-
ing county officials to administer permissible qualifications of honesty, intelligence, in-
tegrity, good character, and sound judgment in Alabama jury selection system so as not
to exclude black citizens from grand and petit juries); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
270-71 (1947) (conviction by New York special jury constitutional).
81. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875 (1976).
82. Id. § 1865.
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limits to the cross section of the community standard, all of which are
constitutional,8 3 can be seen as an attempt to ensure the selection of
jurors better able to understand the issues in a case and to return a
verdict based on a reasoned evaluation of the facts.8 4 Cross-sectionality
requires only that no cognizable group in the community be excluded
systematically from jury panels.s0 Although this does not mean that each
jury must contain members of every cognizable group,80 a jury selection
procedure that resulted in any systematic exclusion would violate the
Constitution.
8 7
The rule that juries must be drawn from a cross section of the com-
munity must be considered in harmony with the Fifth Amendment's
-due process requirement of a fair trial before a panel of impartial,
indifferent jurors.88 This "attitude of appropriate indifference"8 9 re-
quires the exclusion of any juror who has an interest in the outcome
of the trial9 ° or whose opinions of the case have become immutable.9 1
83. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 594 (10th Cir. 1976) (statutory dis-
qualification of persons unable to read, write, or understand English excludes no cogni-
zable group from jury service); Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (state
statute excluding blind and deaf persons from jury service does not violate Constitution).
84. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1973) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.)
(prohibiting use of jurors incapable of rendering impartial verdict based on evidence and
law).
85. To establish a violation of § 1861 of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,
one must show the systematic exclusion of a distinctive or cognizable group in the com-
munity. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d
1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973) (citing United States v. James,
453 F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1971)). The test for "cognizability" has been held to include,
"'(1) the presence of some quality or attribute which 'defines and limits' the group; (2)
a cohesiveness of 'attitudes or ideas or experience' which distinguishes the group from
the general social milieu; and (3) a 'community of interest' which may not be represented
by other segments of society.'" United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 591 (10th Cir. 1976)
(quoting United States v. Test, 399 F. Supp. 683, 689 (D. Colo. 1975)).
86. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
87. See Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947
(1975) (equating cross section of community requirement with constitutional standard of
due process and equal protection clauses of Fourteenth Amendment).
88. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). The rule that potential jurors be
summoned from a cross section of the community may, in part, be a practical way to
ensure the selection of impartial juries. In Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967), the court stated that "the constitutional imperative [not to
pursue a course of conduct that results in racial discrimination in the selection of jurors]
is the by-product of experience in finding a practicable means of overcoming the evil
consistent with constitutional demands." Id. at 12. The statement seems to imply that
the cross section of the community requirement was hit upon by the courts as a
rule of thumb for government officials to employ in the selection of jurors. Although
there are certainly other values behind the cross-section standard as well, see pp. 1167-68
supra, this link to the due process requirement of impartiality can be of valuable as-
sistance in understanding the true scope of the cross section of the community standard.
89. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936).
90. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947) (trial must be held before tribunal
not biased by interest in outcome).
91. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).
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Litigants in civil trials thus are protected from any juror who is "in-
capable of rendering an impartial verdict, based on the evidence and
the law."
92
Even if a juror were impartial, however, he would be incapable of
basing his decision on the evidence presented in court if he were not
competent to evaluate that evidence. Courts have required that juries be
able "to decide the facts in an informed and capable manner"9 3 and to
understand and address rationally the issues of the case.04 Furthermore,
courts have indicated that there is a due process right to a competent
and rational finder of fact.95 The requirement that jurors be com-
petent to understand the issues of the case is complementary to the
statutory elimination from jury service of illiterates, those who speak
no English, and those with serious mental or physical infirmities.9 6 The
parties are entitled to a jury drawn from "a cross-section of the popula-
tion suitable in character and intelligence for that civic duty.
' 9 7
92. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.). Although
the Seventh Amendment does not mention impartiality as an essential characteristic of
a civil jury, the Court has said, "The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in
connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial
jury drawn from a cross-section of the community." Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 220 (1946).
93. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
94. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 711 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S. April 28, 1980) (No. 79-1383).
Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that there was no right
to a jury trial in this complex case, the opinion specifically withheld judgment regarding
"a right to a 'competent' fact-finder." In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411,
427 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S. April 28, 1980) (No. 79-1383).
95. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.)
(due process right to "competent and impartial tribunal"); In re U.S. Financial Sec.
Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 427 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3694 (US. April 28,
1980) (No. 79-1383) ("We assume, without deciding, that there is such a [due process] right
to a 'competent' fact-finder."); cf. Kirkham, supra note 1, at 208 (merely to afford op-
portunity to present evidence and argument in forum unable to comprehend them denies
due process and is "a mockery of justice").
Cases in which circumstances were found to have prevented rational decisionmaking
provide valuable illustrations of the Supreme Court's position. Trial by an insane juror
has been held to constitute a denial of due process, see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501
(1972) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.) (citing Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167,
176 (1912)), as has trial before a jury intimidated by mob violence, see Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493, 501 (1972) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.) (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86, 90-91 (1923)). If a jury is unable to conduct its deliberations without confusion and
uncertainty, the Court has said that the fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause is
denied. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931).
96. See pp. 1168-69 suPra.
97. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953) (Court will not dictate proper source of
jury lists so long as' source meets cross-section requirement). The Court has held that
litigants are not the only ones to have an interest in constitutional jury selection pro-
cedures. Potential jurors themselves have a right not to be excluded from juries by un-
constitutional means. Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970).
This right to nondiscriminatory jury selection does not, however, go beyond the litigants'
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Traditional juries may fall short of satisfying these constitutional
requirements of impartiality and rationality when faced with large,
complicated cases. Recent decisions have held that ordinary jurors are
incapable of deciding complex cases fairly and rationally. The "com-
monsense judgment of the community" that the jury is meant to
provide"0 is absent if the jurors cannot comprehend the proceedings. 00
Rather than protecting litigants from "the exercise of arbitrary pow-
er,'101 the jury itself may become the source of arbitrary decisions.' 02
Special juries are a constitutional alternative to ordinary juries in
the trial of complex cases. The exclusion from the special jury of
persons who are unable to understand the issues does not result in
invidious discrimination against a cognizable group'0 3 any more than
does the permissible statutory disqualification of illiterates or those
who do not understand English.104 "[There is] no constitutional or
statutory right that 'ignorance' be represented in the jury box."'013
Selection of special jurors on the basis of their ability to understand
rights. A juror who could not return a rational verdict based on the facts and the law
cannot demand that jurors like himself be selected. See Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp.
1235, 1241 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (litigant's interest in securing impartial jury superior to in-
dividual's interest in serving as juror).
98. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
99. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
100. See Comment, suPra note 4, at 784 (ordinary jurors may rely on own experience
as standard of judgment in criminal, tort, or simple contract actions; such points of
reference inapplicable, however, to complicated antitrust and securities violations).
101. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
102. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 423, 448-49 (N.D. Cal. 1978). If the jury is unable to comprehend the facts and the
law as presented at trial, the verdict will not reflect a rational resolution of the issues in
the case. While one must assume a good-faith effort on the part of jurors to reach a
rational decision, they easily could base their verdict on extraneous factors, such as the
attitude of the judge or the erudition of the lawyers. The jury thus would cease to be a
shield and would become an instrument of arbitrary decisionmaking.
103. Cf., United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 878
(1962) (jury selection system tending to eliminate those with less than eighth-grade educa-
tion is constitutional). Persons excluded from the special jury for their inability to under-
stand the issues in the case would not constitute a cognizable group. Such persons would
possess none of the indicia of cognizability as defined in United States v. Test, 550 F.2d
577, 591 (10th Cir. 1976), see note 85 supra (quoting Test standard). Incompetent jurors
do not comprise a "community of interest" that would be left unrepresented if they were
excluded from the jury. A rural day-laborer and a small-town grocer may neither one
comprehend a complicated securities case, but they could hardly be said to share "a
cohesiveness of attitudes or ideas or experience" distinguishing them from society at
large. Their only common trait would be an inability to understand the complex case
and that factor cannot claim constitutional protection.
104. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 594 (10th Cir. 1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1865
(1976).
105. United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
878 (1962).
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the problems presented in a complex case would exclude only those
persons whose lack of comprehension would interfere with rational
decisionmaking-a reasonable exclusion similar to those that have been
approved by the Court. 10 6 Special juries thus could maintain the repre-
sentational values of the cross-section of the community standard and
uphold the due process mandate for jury competence and impartial-
ity. 07
III. A Proposal for the Use of Special Juries in
Complex Civil Litigation
This Note proposes that Congress amend the federal Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968108 to allow the use of special juries in lengthy,
complicated civil cases. Any party to a complex suit should be allowed
to move for trial by a special jury. 0 9 The court would then be required
to determine: (a) whether the concepts involved were beyond "the
practical abilities and limitations" of an ordinary jury; 1"0 (b) whether
it appeared that the trial would be excessively lengthy, for example,
consuming more than fifty trial days;"' and (c) whether the use of a
special jury would result in unfairness or bias toward any party. If the
court determined that the case was indeed complex, that it was likely
106. See pp. 1168-69 suPra.
107. The special jury selection procedures proposed in this Note would speak to the
problem of obtaining a cross section of competent jurors. The problem of jury im-
partiality would be solved as it is with traditional juries, by using the challenge for cause.
See pp. 1174-75 infra.
108. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875 (1976).
109. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b) (procedure for demanding jury trial in federal court).
110. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970); note 40 supra (discussing
Ross). Concepts that are beyond a jury's abilities should be only those that require such
special knowledge or are so complex that a jury could not be adequately educated about
them during the course of the trial.
Ill. During the 12-month period ending June 30, 1977, seven civil trials of over 50
trial days in length were completed in the federal courts. [1977] DIRECTOR OF THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. Table C-9, at 353. During
the 12-month period ending June 30, 1976, nine such trials were completed in the federal
courts. [1976] DIRE roR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN.
REP. Table C-9, at 334.
The number of 50 trial days is somewhat arbitrary and should be regarded as nothing
more than a guide in determining whether to use a special jury. Among the cases in
which a demand for a jury trial was struck for reasons of complexity, the shortest
estimated trial time was four months. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a motion to strike
a jury demand was denied at least in part because the trial was expected to last only two
months. Assuming 15 to 20 trial days per month, the Bernstein case would have consumed
between 60 and 80 trial days while Jones would have taken 30 to 40 days to try. The
figure 50 was chosen because it falls between these estimates. The judge should use his
discretion as to what constitutes "protracted" litigation for the purposes of the special
jury.
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to be protracted, and that no unfairness would result, the motion for
trial by a special jury should be granted. 112
In deciding whether the use of a special jury would result in any
unfairness, the court should consider the nature of the case, the parties
involved, and the due process requirements of impartiality and ra-
tionality. If the court found that the use of a special jury would be
likely to result in a denial of due process to any party, the motion
should be denied.113 For example, in a derivative suit brought by a
small shareholder against the officers of a large corporation, it might
be impossible to find special jurors who did not have either a strong
pro-corporate or pro-investor bias. If the decision of the case were to
turn on these biases, there would be no impartial jury trial. On the
other hand, a complex antitrust action by one large corporation against
another would seem perfectly suited to the use of a special jury. The
opponents would be similar enough that special jurors would not be
swayed by inherent biases related to parties. The jurors thus could
decide the case on the basis of the evidence and arguments presented
in court and not on the basis of the relative positions of the parties.
A different problem for use of the special jury would arise when the
bias related not to the parties but to potential jurors' attitudes towards
the law. Consider, for example, a government suit to restructure an
entire industry.14 It might be that anyone qualified for special jury
service would oppose massive government interference in the structure
of the economy.115 Such a jury would be as incapable of deciding the
112. It should be emphasized that motions for a special jury trial are not to be
granted haphazardly. The judge should bear in mind that the special jury proposed here
is an extraordinary procedure to be used in extraordinary cases. If the matters to be
decided are not beyond "the practical abilities and limitations" of ordinary jurors, the
special jury should not be employed. Furthermore, if a traditional jury could be educated
sufficiently about the issues during the course of the trial, a special jury would be un-
necessary. The three conditions of complexity, excessive length, and absence of unfairness
must all be met before a motion for a special jury should be granted.
113. Although a motion for trial by a special jury is to be considered within the
discretion of the trial court, a ruling on such a motion would be appealable if certified
for interlocutory appeal by the district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
114. See, e.g., In re Kellogg Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,898 (FTC, Dkt. 8883, complaint issued April 26, 1972) (action against ready-to-eat
cereal manufacturers). The Kellogg action has been criticized by several commentators.
See, e.g., Kiechel, The Soggy Case Against the Cereal Industry, Fortune, April 10, 1978, at
49; Kruse, Deconcentration and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 46 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 200 (1978).
115. American economics and economic education frequently have been attacked for
their conservative, free-market bias. See, e.g., Staple, Free-Market Cram Course for Judges,
THE NATION, Jan. 26, 1980, at 78. Anyone who has acquired the requisite skills to under-
stand certain complex cases thus may have acquired free-market presumptions that render
fair and impartial decisions impossible. In addition, depending on the professional and
social status of most qualified special jurors, self-interest may unduly bias them for or
against certain types of suits.
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case fairly and impartially as would a jury whose members had been
unalterably influenced by pretrial publicity.11 In such circumstances,
the request for a special jury should be denied. 1 7
One of the virtues often attributed to trial by jury is that jurors can
inject community values into the legal process." 8 A special jury would
be useful in situations too complex for the ordinary juror to under-
stand the issues and to apply these community values. When, however,
the values of special jurors in a given case diverge sharply from those
of the community, the special jury would no longer possess that im-
portant representational quality. In such instances as well, the case
should be deemed improper for special jury resolution."19
Once a court determined that a case was suitable for trial by a special
jury, selection of jurors could advance in any of several ways. Two
procedures particularly recommend themselves as being practical and
efficient while abiding by the requirements of the Seventh Amend-
ment and the due process clause. The first possibility is to use a more
elaborate version of the juror qualification form now employed by the
federal courts. 20 Once a motion for a special jury had been granted,
the names of as many persons as necessary would be drawn at random
from the master jury wheel.' 2 ' Those whose names were drawn would
be sent a juror qualification form to be completed and returned to the
court. The form would be designed to identify those persons most likely
to understand the issues to be decided in the complicated case at
hand.1 22 Persons so identified would be summoned for jury duty ac-
116. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (pretrial publicity fixing belief of defendant's
guilt in minds of potential jurors denied possibility of fair trial).
117. This problem should arise only if there is evidence that all potential special jurors
are biased concerning a particular issue. In the case of biased individuals-for example,
economists who believe that monopoly is a good thing and will find for the monopolist
regardless of the law-the bias should be discovered at voir dire and the individuals ex-
cused upon a challenge for cause.
118. See, e.g., pp. 1159, 1167-68 suPra; Comment, supra note 4, at 784.
119. If a complex case is inappropriate for a special jury and trial by an ordinary jury
or a judge is unacceptable, there may be no practical, constitutional way to decide the
suit. Although this would be a disturbing state of affairs from a policy perspective, it
would be no different than the situation that now exists. See pp. 1157-59 supra.
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a) (1976).
121. Id. §§ 1863(b)(4), 1864(a).
122. What constitutes a person qualified for special jury service would vary with each
case. The juror qualification form would have to be designed with the requirements of
the specific situation in mind. For example, a questionnaire for a complicated antitrust
action might seek to identify persons with a knowledge of economics or, perhaps, with
technical training; a form for a securities fraud case may focus more on one's familiarity
with the workings of large corporations and corporate finance. Whatever the particular
circumstances, anyone who could understand the issues would qualify for the special jury.
This proposal is not for special juries composed of experts, but only for jurors drawn from
a cross section of the community capable of understanding the facts and the law and of
rendering a rational verdict. See p. 1170 supra.
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cording to procedures now obtaining in the federal courts.123 The
parties could then examine the potential special jurors and exercise
their peremptory challenges and challenges for cause.' 2 4 The ad-
vantages to this method would be that a random cross section of com-
petent jurors could be identified and summoned, and that most of the
features of the Jury Selection and Service Act would be maintained.
The major defect of the plan is that it would require considerable time
and effort on the part of the court. It is not inconceivable that hundreds
of juror qualification forms would have to be reviewed before com-
petent jurors could be found for whom extended jury service would
not constitute an undue hardship. 2 5
An alternative selection procedure would not be such a burden on
judicial resources. Each side would nominate a representative, the two
representatives would choose a third person, and the three of them
would assemble a qualified panel of prospective jurors. The court
would then examine each of the prospective jurors and the persons
who selected them in order to ascertain that no improper criteria such
as race or gender were employed in the selection process. Once the
court was satisfied that the panel was properly assembled, the jury
would be selected employing current procedures.' 20 Under this system,
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1866 (1976).
124. Id. § 1870. Whatever procedure is used to select a special jury, the criteria for
granting challenges for cause or favor will have to be adjusted. At present, a juror who is
better prepared by education or experience to understand a complicated case is often the
object of a challenge for cause. See p. 1157 supra. If the special jury is to function, judges
must not allow challenges to jurors simply because they are better qualified. An alterna-
tive formulation might be to excuse a juror only upon a showing that the juror will be
unable to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and the law.
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (1976) (allowing court to excuse persons from jury service
upon showing of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience). A major cause of hardship
would be financial constraints caused by extended jury service. Because under current
law special jurors would receive only a $30 per day jury attendance fee, plus travel ex-
penses, id. § 1871(b), a juror whose income would be affected by special jury service may
suffer severe financial hardship. If service on a special jury would result in economic
hardship for a potential juror, the court should consider it an instance of "undue hard-
ship or extreme inconvenience" and excuse the person from jury service.
One way to reduce the number of potential special jurors excused for financial reasons
would be to pay special jurors more-perhaps as much as $100 or $200 per day. The
obvious drawback to such a plan would be the increased expense. Jury costs for a six-
month trial at S200 per juror per day easily could reach S300,000. Although there probably
would not be many special jury trials, the government may not want to assume such a
potentially crushing financial burden. The parties could bear the increased cost of a
special jury trial, but this path should be discouraged. Access to special juries ought not
to depend on the litigant's ability to pay for the privilege. It is hoped that the pro-
cedures for special jury selection outlined in this Note would provide a sufficient supply
of potential special jurors for whom service would not be an economic hardship. If events
prove otherwise, it may be necessary to devise some means for increased remuneration of
special jurors.
126. 28 US.C. § 1870 (1976).
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the court's time and energy would not be required until the actual
voir dire. In addition, it would not be necessary to summon dozens of
people only to excuse them from service because of the length of the
trial. The jury selectors would know to search for competent jurors
from among the ranks of government, academia, retired business and
professional people, and other groups for whom extended jury service
would not constitute an excessive burden. The problem with this ap-
proach would be its vulnerability to charges of impropriety in the
selection criteria. The court would have to exercise strictest supervision
over the jury selectors to ensure that those summoned for jury duty
represented as broad a cross section of the community as possible.
Despite the drawbacks, each of these schemes presents a workable
means for summoning special jurors. Neither procedure would sys-
tematically exclude any cognizable group from jury service, yet both
would assure a ready supply of competent jurors for complex cases. 127
The special jury selection process thus would employ reasonable classi-
fications related to a juror's ability without any impermissible dis-
crimination.
Conclusion
Complex civil litigation presents many problems for judicial ad-
ministration that can, in part, be satisfied by the use of special juries.
Such juries are constitutionally acceptable because they comport with
the historical requirements of the Seventh Amendment and the re-
quirements of due process. Moreover, in some instances, trial by a
traditional jury or by a judge does not satisfy these requirements and
the special jury is a superior alternative. If chosen with strict observance
of constitutional requirements and prudently administered, the special
jury can be a' constitutional, workable, and desirable solution to the
problems of trying complex cases.
127. It is possible that a case requiring a special jury would be brought in a remote
or sparsely populated district in which qualified individuals would be difficult if not
impossible to find. Such a situation should be considered as grounds for a motion for
change of venue. See id. § 1404. It should be noted, however, that all cases in which the
question of jury competence has been raised have been in major metropolitan areas. See,
e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(Philadelphia); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (San Francisco).
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